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The deductive paradigm has produced notable successes in epidemiology and public health. But while deductive
logic has made a substantial contribution to the public health field, it must be recognized that there are also limits
to that contribution. This report examines one such limit: the need for non-deductive models in public health
reasoning. The findings of a study of public health reasoning in 879 members of the public are reported. Four
non-deductive strategies were chosen for their capacity to bridge gaps in one’s knowledge. It emerged that
subjects were adept at using these strategies in the absence of knowledge to arrive at judgements about public
health problems. The implications of this finding for public health communication are discussed.Background
Deductive reasoning is a powerful logical resource.
Through valid inferences from true premises, deductive
reasoning carries a guarantee that a derived conclusion
is not only certain to be true but should be viewed as
such by any rational person. But deductive reasoning is
limited in one important respect. Notwithstanding its
dominance in logic, deductive reasoning plays a somewhat
minor role in the various deliberations which feature in
our daily lives. From financial and moral problem-solving
to decisions about our health and wellbeing, deductive
reasoning is largely displaced during these deliberations
by forms of reasoning which rarely receive serious treat-
ment in logic textbooks. These non-deductive reasoning
strategies, which include arguing in circles and from a lack
of knowledge, prioritise effective problem-solving and
other forms of decision-making over the deductive validity
and soundness of arguments. De Beaugrande and Dressler
(1981: 93–94) state that ‘[h]umans are evidently capable of
intricate reasoning processes that traditional logics cannot
explain: jumping to conclusions, pursuing subjective ana-
logies, and even reasoning in the absence of knowledge....
The important standard here is not that such a procedure
is logically unsound, but rather that the procedures work
well enough in everyday affairs’ [1]. In this short report, I
describe the findings of a study of public health reasoning
in 879 members of the public. This study explored the useCorrespondence: louise.cummings@ntu.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orof four non-deductive reasoning strategies in the context
of public health deliberations. The findings reveal that
people are adept at using non-deductive reasoning strat-
egies during complex problem-solving in matters of public
health. We begin with a brief examination of the strategies
in question, and consider their role in public health
reasoning.
The limits of deduction
Deduction involves linear, unidirectional reasoning typ-
ically from one or two premises to a single conclusion.
The premises and conclusions of deductive arguments
are variously characterized as true, certain or known
propositions. Deductive reasoning is particularly suited
to domains in which theses or statements have the status
of certainties or are at least well-established proposi-
tions. But many (or most) areas of enquiry lack the type
of propositional certainties which are the essence of
deduction. Instead, people tend to reason from prem-
ises which have the status of presumptions, using
inferences which are non-linear and bidirectional in
nature (e.g. circular reasoning) [2]. Public health, it is
contended, is one domain in which non-deductive
reasoning from presumptive premises predominates.
On account of a lack of knowledge and other epi-
stemic limitations, people employ reasoning strategies
about public health problems which differ markedly
from deduction. Four such strategies include arguing
from ignorance and from authority, and the use of
circular and analogical reasoning. Each of these reasoningtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Table 1 Subject characteristics
Subject characteristics (total = 879 subjects)
Age Average: 43.8 years
Range: 18–65 years
Gender Male: 292 subjects
Female: 587 subjects
Education University level: 589 subjects
Secondary school level: 290 subjects
Ethnicity White British: 789 subjects
White Irish: 30 subjects
Asian or British Asian Indian: 15 subjects
Asian or British Asian Pakistani: 4 subjects
Black or Black British Caribbean: 3 subjects
Black or Black British African: 3 subjects
Mixed: White and Black Caribbean: 1 subject
Mixed: White and Black African: 1 subject
Mixed: White and Asian: 1 subject
Other: 32 subjects
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on account of its ability to bridge gaps in one’s know-
ledge. This important heuristic function of these strat-
egies has been discussed in several publications to
date [3-9]. For the purposes of the current discussion,
this function is demonstrated in the case of one of
these strategies, the argument from ignorance. In a
classic argument from ignorance, one argues from an
absence of knowledge or evidence that P is true to
the conclusion that P is false (also, from an absence
of knowledge or evidence that P is false to the con-
clusion that P is true). The former version of this
argument has the following form:
There is no evidence that scrapie is transmissible to
humans.
Therefore, scrapie is not transmissible to humans.
The standard logical view of the argument from ignor-
ance is that it is an informal fallacy – a lack of know-
ledge, it is contended, is a weak basis indeed for a
conclusion about the truth or falsity of a proposition.
However, in more recent logical analyses this argument
is considered to be not only non-fallacious but strongly
rationally warranted under certain epistemic conditions.
These conditions include the epistemic closure of a
knowledge base in a particular domain and the exhaust-
ive search of that base. These conditions were fulfilled in
the case of the above argument from ignorance which
came to prominence during the UK’s BSE epidemic. This
argument represented the conclusion of a study by
Brown and colleagues in 1987 [10]. Certain attributes of
this study conferred strong rational warrant on the con-
clusion of the argument. Specifically, a 15-year epi-
demiological investigation of scrapie (a brain disease in
sheep) and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in France
enabled investigators to claim closure of the knowledge
base on these diseases. Additionally, a review of the
world literature by Brown and his colleagues allowed
them to claim that this knowledge base had also been
exhaustively searched. Under these epistemic conditions,
a lack of evidence was a strong rational basis for the
conclusion that scrapie is not transmissible to humans.
This conclusion had considerable significance for scien-
tists who later used it extensively in BSE risk assess-
ments. (Most of these assessments were arrived at
through an analogy with scrapie.) The heuristic value of
this argument from ignorance lay in its use of an ab-
sence of knowledge or evidence to arrive at a conclusion
about the non-transmissibility of scrapie to humans. The
other non-deductive strategies examined in the current
study have similar heuristic functions. The reader is re-
ferred to Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) for discussion
of the nature and function of heuristics [11].Study of public health reasoning
A total of 879 members of the public participated in a
questionnaire study of public health reasoning. Subjects,
who were both male and female and aged between 18
and 65 years, were from diverse educational, socioeco-
nomic and ethnic backgrounds (see Table 1). All subjects
completed an anonymous postal questionnaire in which
a number of (actual and non-actual) public health sce-
narios were presented (see Table 2). Several epistemic
conditions, which were expected to confer differing
levels of rational warrant on the four non-deductive rea-
soning strategies, were systematically manipulated across
these scenarios. Four questions followed each passage.
Two of these questions could be answered on the basis
of information explicitly presented in the passage. These
questions were intended to create the impression among
subjects that they were participating in a reading com-
prehension task. A third question examined if a particu-
lar inference had been drawn. A fourth question was
open-ended and encouraged subjects to elaborate on the
grounds for their response to the inference question. All
passages were scrutinised by two public health consul-
tants in advance of the study, and were considered to
have high plausibility. Two linguists also examined the
passages and assessed them to be comprehensible to the
average reader.
Full results of the study are reported elsewhere [12].
Quantitative and qualitative data analyses indicated that
subjects are adept at recognising the epistemic conditions
under which all four non-deductive reasoning strategies
are rationally warranted. Judgements about the problems
presented in the scenarios revealed that conditions such
Table 2 Public health scenarios
Description of public health scenario
Arguments from authority:
1 Pronouncements on BSE by the Spongiform Encephalopathy
Advisory Committee
2 Use of chemicals in food production
3 Aspirin use and Reye’s syndrome in children
4 Cancer risks posed by a nuclear power facility
5 Safety of the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine
6 Electromagnetic emissions from mobile phone masts
7 Pronouncements on BSE by the Southwood Working Party
8 Air-borne chemical emissions from a recycling facility
Arguments from ignorance:
9 Risk assessment of the transmissibility of scrapie to humans
10 Assessment of findings from clinical trials of a new asthma drug
11 Risk assessment of the transmissibility of BSE to humans
12 Health risks associated with chemicals in effluent from a
pharmaceutical plant
13 Assessment of the safety of genetically modified foods
14 Assessment of the safety of a food additive in dairy products
15 Safety of swine flu immunization
16 Location of the source of an outbreak of severe food poisoning
Analogical argument:
17 The use of hepatitis B by the CDC in the US as a model for
HIV/AIDS health advice
18 Investigation by epidemiologists of illness related to chemicals
in drinking water
19 Use of scrapie by British scientists to assess the risk of BSE to
human health
20 A study by epidemiologists of the health effects of a new
arthritis drug
Circular argument:
21 Investigation of fever in patients following vaccination for
pneumonia
22 Investigation of a disease outbreak in the Congo by scientists
from WHO
23 Study of a purported link between electromagnetic radiation
and birth defects
24 Discovery of a novel disease by medical anthropologists
working in Peru
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sway for subjects. Subjects were aware of the conditions
which precluded the closure of a knowledge base, tainted
the opinion of an authority and justified the use of circles
and analogies in reasoning. Moreover, they exercised these
logical judgements in ways which were proportionate to
the epistemic conditions which confronted investigators.
Qualitative comments revealed several intuitive pragmatic
criteria which were influential in subjects’ reasoning such
as the cost in human health of delays in implementing
public health measures. These criteria were taken towarrant a form of reasoning which was less oriented to
achieving certain and true conclusions than the effective
and timely implementation of public health actions.
Judgement-making was not affected by the age, gender or
education of subjects and was only minimally influenced
by the presence of actual versus non-actual public health
scenarios.
Discussion
This investigation has revealed a rational competence on
the part of humans that has been occluded from view by
the traditional dominance of deduction in logic. This
competence embodies a number of non-deductive rea-
soning strategies which serve humans well in contexts
that are characterised by epistemic uncertainty. Public
health is just such a context. When knowledge and evi-
dence are lacking, the rational cognitive agent can ill-
afford to suspend judgement until such times as evidence
is forthcoming. Rather, this agent must draw upon cogni-
tive strategies which fall short of a deductive logical stand-
ard in reasoning but which are nevertheless effective
procedures (or heuristics) for arriving at solutions to prob-
lems. In serving to bridge gaps in our knowledge of public
health problems, the four forms of reasoning examined in
this study can be seen to function as cognitive heuristics.
Through use of these strategies, subjects were able to ar-
rive at some decision about the public health problems
that confronted them rather than make no decision about
these problems at all. These strategies can be added to a
growing list of heuristics which is currently under investi-
gation by cognitive scientists. Although these heuristics
vary in their structure and function, they are all evolution-
ary adaptations of our rational resources to the problems
of uncertainty and a lack of knowledge in the cognitive
sphere.
Conclusion
This study has shown that subjects are adept at using
non-deductive reasoning strategies in their deliberations
about public health problems. One implication of this
study is that public health workers should seek to exploit
this rational resource wherever possible. The most obvi-
ous way in which this can be achieved is during communi-
cation with the public. All too often during public health
communication, members of the public are presented with
recommendations in the absence of the wider epistemic
context which is the rational basis of those recommenda-
tions. There is a mistaken assumption that because the
public lacks expert knowledge of public health issues, they
also lack a rational capacity to judge those issues. If this
study demonstrates anything it is that members of
the public are reasonably skilled in the manipulation
of non-deductive reasoning strategies. The challenge now
is for public health workers to integrate these strategies
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the public.
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